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Abstract
This paper presents a political economy model of in￿ ation as a result of social con￿ ict. Agents
are heterogeneous in terms of income. Agents￿income levels determine their ability to hedge against
the e⁄ects of in￿ ation. The interaction of heterogeneous cash holdings and preferences over ￿scal
policy leads to con￿ ict over how to ￿nance government expenditure.
The model makes a number of predictions concerning which environments are conducive to the
emergence of persistent in￿ ation. In￿ ation will tend to be higher in countries with higher inequality
and with greater pro-rich bias in the political system. Conversely, the use of income tax will be
higher in countries with lower inequality and less pro-rich bias. The model also predicts that
although inequality and political bias will have an impact on the composition of revenue, it will
have no e⁄ect on the overall level of government spending (assuming that spending is on public
goods only). These results are largely con￿rmed by the empirical portion of the paper.
The paper￿ s novel features are its simpli￿cations at the household level which allow for richer
treatment of the income distribution and political process than in the related literature. The paper
also gives unequivocal comparative statics results under relatively undemanding assumptions.
Note: Preliminary Research; please do not circulate more widely without consultation with
author.
1 Introduction
This paper is motivated by a stylised fact in the world economy, the fact that unequal societies tend
to su⁄er from higher than average rates of in￿ ation. This correlation has been noted by a number of
studies, including Albanesi (2002), Easterly and Fischer (2001), Romer and Romer (1998) and Bulif
(1998). This result is backed up by my own empirical ￿ndings, presented later in the paper.
Other studies based on within-country data have shown that the incidence of the in￿ ation tax is felt
particularly harshly by poorer agents (Easterly and Fischer (2001), Erosa and Ventura (2002)). Other
work has attempted to simulate the impact of in￿ ation on di⁄erent groups in society, through various
economic channels. Kane and Morisett (1993) argue that for Brazil the impact of in￿ ation was felt
particularly harshly for the poor and middle classes, whereas the wealthy tended to be insulated from
its e⁄ect.
This paper presents a model which explains the positive relationship between in￿ ation and inequality
via political economy considerations, and which incorporates stylised facts concerning agents￿di⁄ering
ability to hedge against in￿ ation. Agents￿ preferences over di⁄erent forms of taxation are shaped
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1by income and by the composition of their asset portfolios. Income tax falls heaviest on the rich,
whereas seigniorage is more costly for poorer agents, as agents￿substitution out of cash is positively
related to exogenous labour income. The political economy environment is modelled as a probabilistic
voting model in which political in￿ uence increases with income. This translates into a weighted utility
maximisation problem, where richer agents are assigned a higher relative weight than poorer agents.
Policy-makers￿ choice of income tax versus seigniorage and the level of government spending is
determined by the interaction of three competing motivations. The ￿rst is to provide the e¢ cient
level of the public good via the optimal choice of taxation. The second motivation is an equity one:
to provide a degree of consumption equalisation. This biases the policy-maker towards using income
taxation, the more progressive form of taxation, to ￿nance government expenditure. However, there is
a third, political bias e⁄ect, that causes the policy-maker to favour policies more bene￿cial to richer
groups in society. This can lead to positive seigniorage in equilibrium as the burden of taxation is
shifted onto the less well-o⁄.
The model predicts that societies with more income inequality and where the pro-rich political bias
is stronger will tend to su⁄er from higher in￿ ation. This paper is similar in spirit to Dolmas et al.
(2000), Bhattacharya et al. (2003) and Albanesi (2002). However, by simplifying the problem at the
household level a more complex income distribution and more interesting policy environment can be
modeled.
In particular, these simpli￿cations allow for a superior treatment of the political economy dimension
of the problem compared to that in the literature to date. For instance, the paper moves beyond the
bargaining approach to the policy game taken in Albanesi (2002), adopting a probabilistic voting set-up
which is more intuitive and realistic and more standard with respect to other strands of the political
economy literature. The model also allows for policy preference heterogeneity going beyond a simple
"rich/poor" dichotomy. Comparative statics results with respect to the impact of income inequality on
the policy equilibrium are also more easily illustrated. The analytical nature of the comparative statics
results is also a step forward compared to other work in this area, such as Battacharya et al. (2003),
which relies on simulation. Finally, the treatment of the public ￿nance problem and the cash-holding
decision is arguably more realistic than that in Dolmas et al. (2000), where seigniorage is used to fund a
lump-sum transfer and all agents hold cash (meaning that seigniorage is a pro-poor policy, contradicting
empirical evidence that the in￿ ation tax is most costly for the poor).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section two discusses the existing literature. Section
three presents the model of the economy. Section four solves for the ￿rst-best welfare-maximising
solution, to provide a suitable benchmark. Section ￿ve introduces the political economy problem. It
solves the Ramsey problem as a special case, providing a second benchmark. Finally, this section
presents the full solution and undertakes some comparative statics analysis. Section six provides an
empirical analysis of the relationships outlined in the theoretical portion of the paper. The empirical
results are generally supportive of the paper￿ s theoretical arguments, although there are some interesting
results that merit further research. Section seven concludes.
2 Existing Literature
Traditional models of the cost of in￿ ation ￿such as menu costs/shoe leather cost models and the new
generation of dynamic sticky price models ￿have tended to place little emphasis on the distributional
impact of price instability. Similarly, most of the ￿ political economy￿literature on monetary policy-
making focusses on time-inconsistency issues rather than questions of distribution and con￿ ict. However,
Kane and Morisett (1993) identify at least four channels by which in￿ ation can a⁄ect the distribution of
income. Agents tend to face di⁄erential access to anti-in￿ ation hedging tools ￿such as foreign-currency
denominated or interest-bearing assets. In￿ ation also shifts the wage pro￿le as di⁄erential bargaining
2strength or access to indexed wages results in di⁄erential rates of real wage erosion. A third channel is
heterogeneity with respect to liabilities ￿some groups have access to subsidised loans whose nominal
interest rates may fail to fully re￿ ect in￿ ationary pressures. Finally, ￿scal drag ￿the so-called Tanzi-
Olivera e⁄ect ￿reduces the real value of non- or inadequately indexed taxes and transfers, redistributing
from net tax-payers to net bene￿t-recipients.
Kane and Morisett￿ s analysis of Brazilian data suggests that high in￿ ation redistributed income
from the poor ￿who su⁄ered real wage erosion ￿and the middle class ￿who su⁄ered the erosion of cash
balances ￿to the rich, worsening the country￿ s already highly skewed distribution of income. Ferreira
and Litch￿eld (1999) also analyse Brazilian data, and ￿nd some time-series evidence of in￿ ation leading
to higher inequality. Cardoso (1992) supports Kane and Morisett￿ s view that in￿ ation￿ s impact on the
poor is primarily through its e⁄ect on real wages ￿a result of imperfect indexation ￿whereas it is the
middle class that pays the in￿ ation tax on cash balances.
Romer and Romer (1998) use a cross-sectional framework to analyse the e⁄ect of macroeconomic
policies on the distribution of income. They ￿nd that macroeconomic stability and low in￿ ation are as-
sociated with improved well-being of the poor over the long-run. Bulif (1998) also uses a cross-sectional
approach, regressing gini coe¢ cients on a number of explanatory variables, including a quadratic ex-
pression in income (to test the Kuznets hypothesis) and dummies for hyperin￿ ation, high in￿ ation, low
moderate in￿ ation and very low in￿ ation. He ￿nds that higher in￿ ation is associated with more inequal-
ity, although the result seems to exhibit a degree of non-monotonicity. In particular, hyperin￿ ationary
countries have higher inequality than other countries but at lower levels of in￿ ation the relationship is
not so clear-cut. Earlier work by the same author (Bulif and Gulde, 1995) based on a panel of devel-
oping and industrial countries also uncovered a positive relationship between in￿ ation and inequality.
Easterly and Fischer (1998) use cross-country data and ￿nd that higher in￿ ation is associated with the
lower 20% of the income distribution having a smaller share of total income, lower minimum wage rates
in relative terms, and higher rates of poverty. An IMF (1996) survey of global in￿ ationary trends found
that ￿ high average in￿ ation and high variability of in￿ ation increase income inequality signi￿cantly.￿
Other authors analyse the link between in￿ ation and poverty. Datt and Ravallion (2002) analyse
panel data from Indian states and ￿nd that regional di⁄erences in the in￿ ation rate contribute positively
to poverty. Conversely, Epaulard (2003) studies a cross-section of almost 100 growth and downturn
episodes in developing countries and ￿nds that very high in￿ ation increases the responsiveness of poverty
to economic slowdowns, but in￿ ation has no direct e⁄ect on poverty.
Some papers have adopted a more rigorous theoretical approach, using a cash-credit goods framework
￿ with an increasing returns element to the credit technology ￿ to argue that the in￿ ation tax is
regressive. This corresponds to the ￿ hedging￿ channel outlined by Kane and Morisett. Erosa and
Ventura (2002) analyse US data, showing that poorer agents are more reliant on cash holdings as a
proportion of their aggregate wealth, making them more exposed to the in￿ ation tax.1 Calibrating
a monetary growth model based on a cash-credit goods framework, they show that the welfare and
redistributive e⁄ects of allowing for this agent heterogeneity are signi￿cant.
Albanesi (2002) and Sturzenegger (1992) both adopt variants of the cash-credit goods model.
Sturzenegger (1992) introduces a foreign currency explicitly, whilst Albanesi (2002) uses the standard
Lucas and Stokey (1983) model, in which a subset of goods must be bought with cash, subject to a
cash-in-advance constraint, and the remainder can be purchased with a costly credit technology. The
advantage of the latter over cash is that it allows agents to avoid the in￿ ation tax.
Sturzenegger￿ s model assumes that less costly goods - viewed as necessities - are more expensive to
pay for using foreign currency, so that they tend to be purchased with cash. ￿ Luxury￿goods that tend to
be purchased only by richer agents are relatively easy to pay for using foreign currency. When in￿ ation
increases, agents purchase more expensive goods through foreign currency and use cash for cheaper
1Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin [29] report similar ￿ndings from the 1989 US Survey of Consumer Finances. Wealthier
and older agents are more likely to hold interest-bearing assets.
3necessities. Hence the in￿ ation tax falls largely on goods with a lower elasticity of demand, re￿ ecting
a key ￿nding of Ramsey￿ s theory of optimal taxation. In this sense in￿ ation may improve economic
e¢ ciency relative to other more distortionary forms of taxation. However, it is also regressive. In other
words, policy-makers face a trade-o⁄ between fairness and e¢ ciency, leading to predictions concerning
government behaviour under di⁄erent assumptions with respect to the government￿ s objective function.
A disadvantage of the Sturzenegger model is the non-standard utility function employed - which
leads one to question the generality of its results - and the limited ￿ rich-poor￿dichotomy in the assumed
income distribution. The derivation of the government￿ s policy objectives through a weighted welfare
function can at best be thought of as a reduced-form expression derived from an implicit model of voting
or lobbying by di⁄erent groups. However, the modeling of this process is not presented explicitly.
Albanesi (2002) presents evidence of a cross-country correlation between in￿ ation and inequality.
However, she argues for ￿at least in part ￿a reverse pattern of causation running from inequality to
in￿ ation. Using a bargaining model to proxy for the political determination of policy, she shows that
greater inequality heightens the political con￿ ict over ￿scal policy, leading to the adoption of in￿ ationary
￿nancing. Agents di⁄er in their exposure to in￿ ation due to di⁄ering abilities to substitute out of cash.
Poorer agents face a higher relative cost of adopting the alternative ￿nancial technology. The policy
environment is characterised by a choice over the composition of taxation between seigniorage and
income tax for a predetermined level of government spending, modelled as a bargaining game.
Albanesi shows that in￿ ation reduces the bargaining power of the poor, since the fallback position ￿
where expenditure is ￿nanced by in￿ ation rather than explicit forms of taxation ￿is made less attractive
as in￿ ation increases. When inequality is higher, the poor are comparatively more exposed to the costs
of in￿ ation, weakening their bargaining position. This results in policy choices re￿ ecting more closely
those of the rich, leading to a greater share of revenue being raised via seigniorage.
Dolmas et al. (2000) use an overlapping generations framework, with a single tax (seigniorage) used
to ￿nance lump sum transfers. They predict that higher inequality causes higher in￿ ation as the median
voter becomes more keen to redistribute resources. One potential weakness of their approach is that the
in￿ ation tax is modeled as a progressive form of taxation, since other tax instruments are unavailable
and seigniorage revenue is returned to households as a lump-sum transfer. This is contradicted by
empirical evidence of the regressive nature of the in￿ ation tax. It also makes their results vulnerable to
the addition of alternative tax instruments, such as a linear income tax. The authors present empirical
evidence of a positive relationship between in￿ ation and inequality, controlling for measures of central
bank independence.
Bhattacharya et al. (2003) employ an overlapping generations model similar to that in this paper,
and predict an inverse-U shaped relationship between inequality and seigniorage. Unlike Dolmas et al.,
they allow for substitution out of cash by richer agents, making seigniorage a regressive tax. In￿ ation
initially increases in inequality but falls for very high levels of inequality due to a tax-base e⁄ect
(basically a La⁄er-curve argument). They present empirical support for this ￿nding based on cross-
sectional data. The possible weaknesses of this approach are twofold. Firstly, the treatment of the
political economy dimension is non-standard, because the failure of voters￿preferences to meet the
￿ single-peakdness￿criterion rules out the use of median voter theory. The approach taken, based on
discretising the policy choice and assuming a series of bilateral contests, is somewhat counterintuitive
and does not match the approach taken elsewhere in the political economy literature. A related problem
is that the voting game can fail to yield an equililibrium under certain parameterisations. Secondly, the
paper relies on simulation, making it di¢ cult for the authors to pin down the processes driving their
results.
Cukierman et al. (1992) focus on political con￿ ict and instability ￿which one would expect to be
linked with inequality other things being equal ￿rather than on inequality per se. They argue that
political instability leads policy-makers to hold o⁄ from ￿scal reforms for electoral reasons, leading
to a greater reliance on in￿ ationary ￿nancing. They ￿nd some cross-sectional evidence to support this
hypothesis. However, Click (1998) ￿nds that seigniorage is explained by the di⁄erential costs of di⁄erent
4methods of taxation and by the institutional set-up governing the central bank, but the measures of
political instability in Cukierman et al. are not signi￿cant once these other factors are controlled for.
Desai et al. (2002) argue that inequality and the political system interact to drive in￿ ation performance.
In high inequality countries, more democracy leads to higher in￿ ation as a result of populist attempts at
redistribution. By contrast, in low inequality countries, the main problem is parasitic governing elites
that create in￿ ation to transfer resources to themselves. In this environment more political competition
will reduce in￿ ation. Again, these authors present some empirical support for this model.
A parallel research question asks which groups in society are more in￿ ation averse. Higher in￿ ation-
aversion amongst poorer groups would suggest that in￿ ation is regressive in character. Fischer and
Huizinga (1982) use US survey data from the 1970s to analyse how factors such as income and po-
litical a¢ liation a⁄ect relative preferences over in￿ ation and unemployment (capturing the trade-o⁄
modelled in Barro and Gordon￿ s classic (1983) paper on the time inconsistency problem in monetary
policy-making). They ￿nd that for the US, richer agents appear to be more in￿ ation-averse, although
they question whether the survey questions really capture the policy trade-o⁄ ￿encapsulating both
preferences over policy outcomes and the ability of policy to a⁄ect these outcomes. In addition, al-
though simple analysis of sample means suggests the rich are more likely to rate in￿ ation as more
important than unemployment, regression analysis does not uncover a signi￿cant income e⁄ect. Scheve
(2002) analyses UK survey data from 1995, and ￿nds that although holders of nominal assets are more
in￿ ation averse (as one would expect), there is not a signi￿cant income e⁄ect on in￿ ation-aversion.
In addition to their direct estimates of in￿ ation on poverty and the income distribution, Easterly
and Fischer also analyse international survey data which asks respondents to rate which of a range
of possible domestic problems they feel to be of greatest concern. They ￿nd that the probability of
nominating in￿ ation as of high concern is higher for poorer and less educated respondents. Shiller (1996)
presents survey data from the US, Germany and Brazil in an attempt to answer a related question:
Why do people dislike in￿ ation? He ￿nds that the traditional economist￿ s answer ￿with a focus on
menu costs and the like ￿is not generally held amongst the population as a whole. Non-economists
tend to view in￿ ation as reducing real wages ￿although whether this is a rational response based on
an experience of nominal wages failing to keep pace with prices or simply money-illusion ￿is not clear.
The view that in￿ ation is ￿ unfair￿because it redistributes income in an arbitrary fashion also appears
to be widely held. This indicates that for the public at large ￿if not for economists ￿the redistributive
impact of in￿ ation is central.
3 The Model
3.1 Demographics, Technology and the Household Problem
The model employs a simpli￿ed overlapping generations framework, similar in spirit to that in Bhat-
tacharya et al. (2003) but greatly simpli￿ed to allow for analytical solutions and to facilitate a fuller
treatment of the income distribution and the political environment.
Each household lives for two periods, with one cohort born each period. In the ￿rst period the
household receives an endowment of the consumption good, yi. Consumption takes place in the second
period, but the good is assumed to be perishable and is destroyed after one period. Hence some
transactions technology is necessary to allow the ￿ young￿to transfer their endowment to the ￿ old￿in
exchange for purchasing power the following period. There are two assets in the economy to facilitate
this exchange: cash (whose supply is controlled by the government) and a second asset in ￿xed supply.2
2The value of each asset depends on the availability of goods supplied by agents in the following period who wish to
exchange for the asset, so that - for instance - the value of the asset falls if fewer goods are available for purchase (the
price of the goods in terms of the asset increases).
5This second asset can be thought of as a real asset, a foreign currency or an indexed asset. Essentially
it is an in￿ ation shelter.
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0 delivers a distribution F1 (y) that second order stochastically dominates the initial distribution
F0 (y).
Households face a utility cost of operating in the market for the second asset, denoted ￿i.3 This
cost is assumed to fall with yi:
￿i = ￿(y) ￿ 0




The empirical and theoretical work on portfolio choice has posited the existence of ￿xed costs of partic-
ipation in markets for non-cash ￿nancial assets. Luttmer (1999) [28] analyses US data on asset holdings
and argues that the lower bound on the cost is 3% of monthly per capita consumption. Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin (1996) [29] argue that the ￿xed cost varies across agents due to individual-speci￿c char-
acteristics, including age, education and ￿nancial wealth. These characteristics in turn a⁄ect income.
The simple inverse relationship between the cost of ￿nancial diversi￿cation and income employed here
can be thought of as a reduced form of a more complex model of portfolio choice.
Utility is given by:
Ui = lnci + ￿lng ￿ ￿iDi
Di = 1 if agent exchanges endowment for the second asset;
0 if exchange is for cash
In addition to consuming the private good, agents also consume a public good g which is funded out
of taxation and seigniorage revenue. The log utility formulation is necessary for expositional simplicity.
Explicit taxation is in the form of a linear income tax ￿ which is paid out of consumption goods
immediately prior to consumption.












where p and q are the prices of goods in terms of cash and the second asset respectively, and m and d
are nominal holdings of cash and the second asset by the household following production.
3Households will not substitute their endowment for a mixture of both assets, because the cost of accessing the market
for the second asset is a ￿xed cost that does not vary in the value of the ￿xed asset held. Hence, a corner solution is
always chosen.
6Consumption is at period t + 1 prices. Hence, the household budget constraint is given by:


















The time subscripts on the prices re￿ ect the fact that agents receive payment for production one
period before consuming themselves. The sole other consumption and production decision for the
household is which asset to hold, which comes down to a choice of Di 2 [0;1]:
Di 2 [0;1] = argmaxUi = lnci + ￿lngt ￿ ￿iDi
s:t:


















Which yields the solution:



















Note that in the foregoing discussion and in what follows, all time subscripts refer to the period in
which the cohort producing or consuming was born, except prices, which refer to the current period.
3.2 General Equilibrium
General Equilibrium is de￿ned by the optimal asset-holding decision for each household, based on beliefs
about the evolution of prices p and q, market clearing conditions for cash, the second asset, and goods,
and budget constraints for each household and the government:


























































gt = ￿t +
mt+1 ￿ mt
pt+1
The ￿rst equation above gives the household budget constraint. The second equation gives the
optimal choice for each household in terms of exchanging its endowment for cash or the second asset.
The third and fourth equations equate supply and demand for the second asset and cash respectively
(market clearing conditions for the asset market). In these equations the terms dt (= d) and mt without
superscripts represent aggregate quantities.
The ￿fth equation gives market clearing conditions in the goods market. Note that total period t
consumption (that is, consumption by cohort t) is equal to the total endowment of the period t + 1
cohort. The ￿nal equation gives the government balanced budget constraint. It shows that the public
good must be funded out of tax revenue and seigniorage.
74 Planner Problem
The planner problem provides us with a benchmark against which to judge the political economy out-
come derived in the following section. The planner is constrained by the economy￿ s resource constraint
but not by the constraints imposed by individual behaviour, since all allocations can be imposed cen-























di + gt = 1 (￿0t)
The sole constraint is the economy-wide resource constraint: that total period t public and private
consumption is equal to total period t + 1 production, which is equal to unity by construction.









Hence, all agents consume the same level of private consumption:
ci
t = c;8i;t
Since consumption is equalised via transfers, the authorities can circumvent the equity-e¢ ciency
trade-o⁄. Substituting into the economy-wide resource constraint gives the optimal (e¢ cient) level of
the public good:
gt = g = 1 ￿ c
Using the FOC for gt:
g = ￿c












= ￿￿i < 0
which implies that Di
t = 0;8i;t.
Note that the choice of seigniorage versus income tax is orthogonal to the planner prob-
lem because all redistributive e⁄ects on private consumption can be o⁄set by individual taxes and
transfers.
85 Political Economy Equilibrium
The political economy environment of the economy is introduced in this section. I also analyse the
Ramsey problem here - a benign policy-maker choosing optimal welfare-maximising policies in a decen-
tralised setting - since it is easily incorporated as a special case of the political economy game. The
￿rst subsection outlines the political economy environment. The second analyses the Ramsey solution,
whilst the third analyses the general solution.
Before describing the political economy problem in detail, I introduce some further notation. Di-


























di = 1 ￿ b mt
Note that, from the second-order stochastic dominance assumption on the income distribution,
@ (1 ￿ b m)
@￿2 ￿ 0










￿ 1 ￿ b ￿t
qt
qt+1
￿ 1 ￿ b qt
Finally, I de￿ne a variable ￿t that summarises the policy stance in terms of ￿t and price changes:
￿t =
1 ￿ b qt ￿ ￿t
1 ￿ b ￿t ￿ ￿t
Substituting this into the decision rule for Di
t yields the following:
Di
t = 0 if ￿i > ln￿t;1 otherwise




5.1 Political Economy Environment
I adopt the probabilistic voting model originally due to Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). I adopt the formu-
lation of Persson and Tabellini (2000). The usefulness of the probabilistic voting model over alternative
models (such as the simple Downes-Hotelling median voter theory) is its additional tractability, as the
introduction of uncertainty in the voting function removes the non-continuities associated with the ear-
lier median-voter models. This greater tractability is particularly important when agent heterogeneity
makes the political economy environment more complex.
It also introduces a greater degree of realism to the model, as in reality votes over party platforms
are determined not only by the particular issue or issues under analysis, but by a variety of other issues.
One way of dealing with this is to label extraneous factors as ￿ ideology￿and model preferences over this
9factor as essentially random, as in the probabilistic voting model. Finally, the model has the additional
advantage that it can easily be applied to multidimensional contests, such as the one analysed here.
By contrast, the median voter model can only be generalised to multidimensional problems if they can
be rendered essentially unidimensional by making simplifying assumptions about how policies map into
voters￿preferences.
5.1.1 The Probablistic Voting Model
Policy-makers are elected for one period, and choose a level of government expenditure gt, a single
income tax rate ￿t, and an expansion in the money supply (mt+1 ￿ mt). The latter is equivalent to
choosing a rate of in￿ ation ￿t or more conveniently a rate of the in￿ ation tax (seigniorage) b ￿t. Policy-
makers derive utility only from being elected, and therefore adopt a policy vector Gt ￿ fgt;￿t;b ￿tg
to maximise their probability of being elected.4 There are two policy-makers seeking election, and the
electoral rule is simple majority voting. For simplicity, it is assumed that policy positions are announced
and the election occurs after agents have made their asset-holding choices. That is, only the ￿ old￿vote,
with the vote taking place at the start of their second period of life.
In addition to their utility derived from consuming public and private goods, agents have some
intrinsic bias towards one or other of the candidates, which is uncorrelated with other aspects of their
individual characteristics, notably their income. The bias has two components, an individual-speci￿c
bias and an economy-wide bias, both of which vary over time. If the two candidates are denoted fA;Bg,
then the biases are denoted as a bias in favour of candidate B, so that a negative value implies a bias
towards candidate A. The individual-speci￿c bias is denoted "i, whilst the economy-wide bias is denoted










I make a critical assumption that agents di⁄er in their political ￿ weight￿wi, where the weight is
increasing monotonifcally in income. This reduced-form formulation is designed to account for the
observed greater political participation by richer agents (see Benabou, 2000 for a similar model and
comprehensive evidence of the in￿ uence of income on political activity and in￿ uence). It can be ratio-
nalised by introducing lobbying (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000) or by simply making richer agents
more likely to vote, or by making the variance of the noise in agents￿voting rules vary inversely with
income.
Formally, I assume that agents￿weight maps into income monotonically, with the relationship in-
4Although the set of policy instruments includes three separate instruments, the government balanced-budget constaint
implies that only two can be independent.
















wi = yi for ￿ = 0
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where b m =
b y Z
0




Hence the political weight is monotonically increasing with income (yielding greater political
in￿ uence to agents higher up the income scale). Since wi = yi for ￿ = 0 and @A
@￿ ￿ 0, the
distribution of weights second-order stochastically dominates income.5
Finally, note that the elasticity of the income of non-cash-holders (or their real holdings of the
non-cash asset) with respect to the inequality parameter is assumed to be lower than the elasticity of
their weighted mass with respect to the same parameter. This condition essentially says that the degree
to which the distribution of weights second-order stochastically dominates the distribution of income
is increasing in inequality. This assumption is critical to the result that increasing inequality leads
to greater seigniorage. It ensures that greater income inequality generates a decrease in the e⁄ective
in￿ ation-averse electorate that outweighs the reduction in the tax base of the in￿ ation tax.6





















Therefore, an agent of type i is a swing voter (indi⁄erent between the two candidates) if:
"i





























5The assumption that the distribution of weights second-order stochastic dominates the distribution of income is
necessary to generate interesting results. This is because the log-linear speci￿cation for utility implies that @U
@C , the
marginal utility of consumption, equals 1
C . When the weights are distributed with less inequality than income, the lobbying
e⁄ect is insu¢ cient to outweigh the utility-equalisation e⁄ect implied by the diminishing marginal utility associated with
log utility. If utility had a linear speci￿cation, then any positive relation between income and political weight would be
su¢ cient to overcome the utility-equalisation e⁄ect, because marginal utilities would already be equal across agents (equal
to unity) by assumption.




should be su¢ ciently elastic with respect
to income.
115.1.2 Solving the Model
Each candidate maximises his probability of winning the election, which is equivalent to maximising
a weighted social welfare function subject to the government budget constraint. The solution is given
formally for candidate A but as discussed above candidate B faces a symmetrical problem and arrives
at the same policy solution.

























t ￿ fgt;￿t;b ￿tg
Ui ￿ lnci
t + ￿lngt ￿ ￿iDi
t;8i









t = 0 if y < b y ￿ ￿￿1 (ln￿t);1 otherwise;8i
The solution to this policy problem is derived from three ￿rst order conditions, one each for b ￿t, ￿t
and gt. The three conditions are given below.
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This assumes that both ￿nancing instruments are used in equilibrium and that the marginal costs are





1 ￿ b m
￿ 1
Assuming that this solution is unique, then the solution for ￿t has to be time invariant. Hence,
agents￿production sector decisions are also time invariant, which implies that qt is constant and b qt =
0;8t. This implies that:
￿ =
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ b ￿
￿ 1
125.2 Ramsey Solution
The Ramsey problem is to maximise aggregate welfare through the optimal choice of instruments
available to the policy-maker and subject to all the behavioural constraints imposed by equilibrium
behaviour on the part of the private sector. The Ramsey solution can be thought of as the solution to
the probabilistic model without the pro-rich bias that enters into the policy-maker￿ s objective function.
This is because, absent this bias, the policy-maker simply maximises aggregate welfare. In other words,
the Ramsey solution equals the general solution with wi = 18i.
The key characteristic of the Ramsey solution is that there is no seigniorage in equilibrium. To
see this, note that if wi = 18i then:
￿ =
1 ￿ F (b y)
F (b y)
b m
1 ￿ b m
￿ 1
With ￿ ￿ 1, F (b y) = b m = 1 (all agents hold cash). Hence ￿ = 1 and b ￿ = 0. The rationale for this is
simple. Absent political-economy considerations, the policy-maker faces a standard trade-o⁄ between
e¢ ciency (optimal public good provision) and equity (consumption-equalisation). Since seigniorage is
the more regressive of the two tax instruments, it worsens the trade-o⁄ and is therefore not utilised in
equilibrium. Another way to interpret the result is the standard Ramsey tax argument: to tax inelastic
factors. Since agents can substitute out of cash-holding (at a cost), cash-holding is tax-elastic. By
contrast the tax base for the income tax is ￿xed.
Note as well that the level of the public good g is equal to the ￿rst-best level. This is demonstrated
in the following section for the general political economy solution (but obviously holds for the special
case Ramsey solution as well).
5.3 General Political Economy Solution
The concavity of the utility function makes the policy-maker disinclined to use seigniorage, since it
worsens inequality. However, the political economy environment makes the policy-maker more inclined
to use seigniorage, since it transfers resources to his more favoured constitutency, richer agents. Hence,
the optimal mix of tax and seigniorage is that which balances these two e⁄ects. When seigniorage is low
relative to total government expenditure, the authorities can increase its use, transfering more resources
to richer agents. However, as seigniorage increases and the consumption of better-o⁄ agents rises and
that of poorer agents falls, the marginal utilities of the less well-o⁄ become weighted more heavily in
the policy-maker￿ s objective function. Hence, the political bias e⁄ect becomes less important relative
to the redistribution e⁄ect. Eventually, the two e⁄ects counter-balance each other, giving the optimal
mix of tax and seigniorage.





1 ￿ b m
￿ 1
5.3.1 Existence and Uniqueness of Political Economy Equilibrium
A solution for ￿ always exists for ￿ > 0. To see this, re-arrange the ￿rst order conditions to give an
expression for the marginal costs and bene￿ts of seigniorage:
h ￿ MC ￿ MB
h
F (b y)(1 ￿ F (b y))
= ￿wy ￿ yw
where w ￿ E [w j y ￿ b y], w ￿ E [w j y > b y]
and y;y are similarly de￿ned.
13When ￿ ! 1, then b y ! 1 , y ! 1, w ! 1 and w > y. Hence:
h
F (b y)(1 ￿ F (b y))
! ￿(w ￿ y) < 0
Therefore, for ￿ close to 1, MC ￿ MB ￿ 0.
Now consider ￿ ! 1. In this case, b y ! 0, y ! 1, w ! 1. Hence:
h
F (b y)(1 ￿ F (b y))
! ￿w ￿ y > 0
Therefore, for very high ￿, MC ￿ MB ￿ 0. Since the expressions are continuous, at least one solution
with MC = MB must exist for ￿ 2 [1;1].
Moreover, since MC ￿ MB for ￿ ! 1 and MC ￿ MB for ￿ ! 1, then at least one of the solutions
also satis￿es the second-order condition for the political economy maximisation problem (
@[MC￿MB]
@￿ >
0). Simulations using various functional forms for F (y);w
￿
y;￿;￿2￿
and ￿(y) suggest that the FOC
does generally describe a unique solution. Figure 1 gives a graphical exposition of equilibrium that sheds
more light on this issue. It plots the MC and MB functions, ￿A(1 ￿ b m) and (1 ￿ A) b m respectively,
against the cdf F (b y (￿)).7
Although a unique solution to the FOC is not guaranteed for general functional forms, a restriction
can be introduced to guarantee a unique solution. Re-arranging the two functions gives us (MC = MB):





. A su¢ cient condition to guarantee a single crossing point is therefore that,
for any value of ￿ = ￿￿ satisfying the FOC:8
@
@b y
[ln(￿ ￿ 1) j ￿ = ￿￿] =
￿￿
￿￿ ￿ 1









In other words, the function ￿ should have a su¢ ciently steep (negative) gradient and the ratio b m
A
should not be too greatly a⁄ected by incremental changes in b y (requiring that both the underlying
distribution F (y) and the mapping w(y;￿) should be relatively smooth). For the rest of the paper I
assume that this condition holds and that the FOC therefore describe a unique solution for ￿.
5.3.2 Comparative Statics
The key comparative statics result is that
d￿
d￿2 > 0. That is, as income inequality increases, the optimal
mix of seigniorage versus income tax shifts towards the former. To show this formally, note that (using
the implicit function theorem):














; w = 3y￿2;
￿ = 3
y; where ￿ denotes a log-normal distribution. See Aitchison and Brown (1957) for details of the calculations using
the log-normal distribution. These functional forms meet the model￿ s key assumptions.
8The other term in the (log-transformed) MB function, ￿ln(1 ￿ b m) has
@(￿ ln(1￿ b m))
@b y = 1
1￿ b m
@ b m
@b y ￿ 0.




@￿ > 0. Hence,
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1
(1 ￿ b m)




(1 ￿ A)(b m ￿ A)
A(1 ￿ b m)
@ (1 ￿ b m)
@￿2 ￿ 0
Hence:
Hypothesis 1(a): In￿ ation increases with income inequality
Hypothesis 2(a): Income tax decreases with income inequality
The rationale for these results is that higher inequality increases the relative weight of richer agents
in the quasi-welfare maximisation problem resulting from the probabilistic voting set-up. This then tilts
the policy-maker towards greater in￿ ation ￿nance and away from income tax as a source of revenue.


























Hypothesis 1(b): In￿ ation increases with the pro-rich bias
Hypothesis 2(b): Income tax decreases with the pro-rich bias
5.3.3 E⁄ect on Government Spending
Changing inequality and pro-rich bias have no e⁄ect on government spending in this model. This is a
result of the log-linear additively separable utility speci￿cation and the fact that all spending is in the
form of a public good. Essentially, distributional considerations matter for the composition of taxation
and its incidence but not for aggregate revenue or expenditure. To see this formally, rewrite the three
FOCs (the FOC for ￿ has been simpli￿ed using the ￿rst FOC):
1
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ b ￿
A
b m









Substituting the government budget constraint and the third FOC into the ￿rst two FOCs yields:
A = ￿0 [1 ￿ (1 ￿ b m)b ￿] b m ￿ ￿b m
1 ￿ A = ￿0 [1 + b mb ￿](1 ￿ b m) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ b m)
15Adding the two together then gives us:
1 = ￿0 ￿ ￿
which implies that ￿0 = 1 + ￿, a constant, and hence that g = ￿
1+￿, the ￿rst-best level of government
spending. Hence:
Hypothesis 3: Government ￿nal expenditure is unrelated to both (a) inequality; and (b) pro-rich
bias.
Note that this hypothesis results largely from the assumption of additive separability in the utility
function with respect to private good and public good consumption. This is a simplifying assumption
of the model and is not central to the analysis; in this sense hypothesis 3 is not central to the paper.
However, if the inequality and bias terms are found to a⁄ect tax and seigniorage choices then the test
of the e⁄ect on spending is essentially a check that the model￿ s emphasis on the revenue side rather
than the expenditure side is correct.
6 Empirical Analysis
This empirical section tests the central hypotheses derived in the theoretical portion of the paper:
1. Higher seigniorage results from:
(a) greater income inequality; and
(b) greater pro-rich bias in policy-making;
2. Higher income tax revenue results from:
(a) less income inequality; and
(b) less pro-rich bias in policy-making;
3. Government ￿nal expenditure (excluding transfers) is unrelated to both:
(a) income inequality; and
(b) pro-rich bias.
The results are strongly supportive of propositions 1(a) and 1(b). Hypothesis 3 (a) is strongly
supported although results with respect to Hypothesis 3 (b) are mixed. There is some evidence sup-
porting Hypotheses 2(a) and 2(b), although again the evidence is mixed. The ￿rst section describes
the methodology employed and the data used. The second section discusses the results of the empirical
analysis, and the third section o⁄ers a brief discussion of the results.
6.1 Methodology and Data
This paper analyses in￿ ation as the result of a political con￿ ict over ￿nancing public expenditure. The
key linkages are between the government budget constraint and seigniorage, and between money cre-
ation and in￿ ation. Both linkages should be conceived as long term phenomena. In the short run, the
gap between expenditure and tax revenue can be made up by borrowing; recourse to seigniorage is not
necessary until the costs of borrowing outweigh the bene￿ts, which may not occur until a substantial
degree of borrowing has occured. Similarly, although Friedman￿ s assertion concerning in￿ ation￿ s mon-
etary genesis is not to be doubted, the short run relationship between the money supply and in￿ ation
is notoriously di¢ cult to pin down (except during hyperin￿ ationary periods).
16Hence, I have taken the long run as the appropriate time frame for analysis. This precludes the
use of a panel approach to the problem, and I therefore adopt a simple cross-section framework. Data
availability makes the 1981-2000 period the most fruitful for analysis.
I obtain data from a range of sources. Inequality data is obtained from the UNU/WIDER World
Income Inequality Database (WIID) in the form of Gini coe¢ cients.9 The quality of the observations
and the survey method is coded in the data: I use only the highest quality data where the sample used is
representative of the country￿ s full population, and adjust observations to take into account the survey
method (gross versus net and income versus expenditure).10 The data is presented in annual format,
although with a substantial number of missing observations for most countries. In order to maximise
the number of observations, data are averaged over the period (i.e. data may be unavailable for the
￿rst year of the period, but available for subsequent years). To control for the endogeneity of income
inequality I use a measure of inequality from the previous twenty-year period (similarly calculated) as
an instrument and undertake Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS).
I use a variety of variables from the Polity IV database, as controls and as a proxy for the pro-rich
bias term (each variable is taken at the start year of the relevant period, i.e. 1981). The key variable
is the "Competitiveness of Political Participation," parcomp, de￿ned in the Polity IV Users Manual
(2000) as ￿ the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the
political arena.￿ The variable takes on an integer value between 0 and 5. I assume that a lower value
for this variable can be taken as a greater pro-rich bias, under the assumption that a lack of political
competition implies greater political power for the rich.11
I include parcomp￿ s counterpart variable, "Competitiveness of Chief Executive Recruitment," xr-
comp, as a control. This variable is similar to parcomp, except that it refers speci￿cally to the process
of selecting the Chief Executive, and takes on an integer value between 0 and 3. I include three other
political variables as further controls: the "Regulation of Participation," parreg, the "Regulation of
Chief Executive Recruitment," xrreg, and a variable measuring the instability of the political system,
denoted unstable.12
The parreg and xrreg variables measure the degree of regulation of the political system as a whole
and the selection of chief executive respectively. The former takes on an integer value between 1 and 5,
the latter an integer between 1 and 3. Regulation refers to the degree of institutionalisation of power
transfers (xrreg) or the degree to which binding rules apply to the timing and procedures of the exercise
of the political process (parreg).
In a sense, the Regulation variables parreg and xrreg should be thought of as more fundamental
measures of the political system than the Competitiveness variables. They indicate whether there
are any properly institutionalised rules governing the political process and the transfer of power. If
either takes the value 1 (unregulated) then the corresponding Competitiveness variable takes the value
0 (unde￿ned). That is, if there are no rules governing the process, then the process by de￿nition
9The starting point for the database (contributing to around half the total observations) is the more widely-used
Deininger and Squire (World Bank, 1997) dataset (used, for instance, in Bhattacharya et al. (2003)).
10The appropriate adjustment is calculated by regressing the high quality observations on dummy variables for Ex-
penditure vs. Income and Gross vs. Net measures, interacted with a dummy for Industrial vs. Developing/Transition
economies to proxy for the substantial structural di⁄erences between tax and transfer systems between the two groups of
countries. This gives an estimate of the average di⁄erence between Gini coe¢ cients based on the di⁄erent measurement
techniques, which is unbiased as long as the choice of methodology for the inequality survey is exogenous.
11Historically, restrictions on participation such as rules governing the franchise have included a lower limit on income
or property holdings, but never (to my knowledge) an upper limit. Hence, restrictions on participation can be taken as
indicators of pro-rich bias.
12The latter variable is a dummy variable which takes on a value of 1 if the existing political system has substantially
changed in the last 10 years. This variable is derived from the "Durable" variable in the Polity IV dataset which measures
the number of years since the last signi￿cant change in the political system, de￿ned as an absolute change of more than
3 points in the "Polity" variable which codes countries on a -10 to +10 (autocratic to democratic) scale. The instability
dummy then takes a value of 1 if "Durable"<10, implying that the existing system is less than 10 years old, and 0
otherwise.
17cannot be considered competitive. When the Regulation variables take on a value of 2 or above, then
the corresponding Competitiveness variable takes on a strictly positive value, indicating successively
greater levels of competitiveness. The Competitiveness variables then tell us that, given that there are
some rules or institutions governing te political process, to what extent the process is open to universal
participation. Clearly, the Regulation variables are important conditioning variables governing the
operation of the Competitiveness variables.
The dependent variables are the average of the "in￿ ation tax" transform (b ￿) over the period (the
average of the annual rates, taken from the IMF￿ s International Financial Statistics) and the average
ratios of income tax revenue and government ￿nal consumption spending to GDP (both taken from the
World Bank￿ s World Development Indicators). I also include a number of control variables, including
dummies for industrial countries, former Eastern Block countries and South American countries, mea-
sures of trade openness and real (PPP) GDP per capita taken from the Penn World Tables (PWT 6.1),
and a measure of urbanisation (% of the population living in urban areas, taken from the World Bank
World Development Indicators). As with the political variables, these controls are taken for the ￿rst
year of the period to denote initial conditions.
6.2 Results
The Results are presented in Tables 1-3 in the Appendix. In each Table, the ￿rst three regressions
have the full range of control variables for robustness purposes. The last three regressions in each Table
give the preferred speci￿cation, including only controls that are individually statistically signi￿cant.
Within each group of three regressions, the ￿rst is for the largest available sample; the second has
only Developing and Transition economies, whilst the third regression drops only former Communist
countries in Eastern Europe.
The results in Table 1 are strongly supportive of Hypothesis 1(a). Only in the second equation
is the estimated coe¢ cient on the Gini statistically insigni￿cant, and even in this equation it has the
correct (positive) sign. In all other speci￿cations it is signi￿cantly positive at the 5% level, and in all
the parsimonious (minimum controls) speci￿cations it is signi￿cant at the 1% level.
The results are also strongly supportive of Hypothesis 1(b): in each speci￿cation the variable
parcomp, acting as a proxy for the (inverse of) pro-rich bias, has the predicted negative sign. The
caveat to this result is that the xrcomp variable - a political control related to the parcomp variable
- has a positive and signi￿cant sign, suggesting that with respect to executive recruitment, it is less
competitive systems (greater pro-rich bias) that produce lower in￿ ation.
Table 2 presents the results with respect to Hypotheses 2(a)-(b). Here the results are more
ambiguous. In the full sample speci￿cations neither the inequality nor the political bias terms are indi-
vidually signi￿cant, although they carry the predicted sign. However, most of the control variables are
similarly insigni￿cant (suggesting that the equation including the controls is mis-speci￿ed). Once only
individually signi￿cant controls are included, the inequality and bias terms are generally statistically
signi￿cant. Both are signi￿cant in the full sample, whilst for the developing/transition economies the
inequality term is signi￿cant but the political bias term is not. When the Eastern European countries
alone are dropped, the political bias term retains its signi￿cance whilst the inequality term does not.
Finally, Table 3 presents tests of Hypotheses 3(a)-(b). When all controls are included in the
regression, the results back up the theoretical model: neither inequality nor the pro-rich bias terms
a⁄ect government consumption spending (our proxy for public good provision). For Hypothesis 3(a)
the parsimonious speci￿cations con￿rm this result: inequality has no e⁄ect on expenditure. However,
the parsimonious speci￿cations ￿nd that - for the full sample and the non-Eastern Europe sample - the
political bias term does a⁄ect expenditure. As pro-rich bias increases (represented by a lower value for
parcomp) expenditure falls. However, the developing countries only sample does not pick up any e⁄ect,
con￿rming the model￿ s predictions.
186.3 Discussion
Table 4 summarizes the quantitative e⁄ects of changes in inequality on the in￿ ation rate, income tax
revenues and government spending. According to our preferred speci￿cation (fourth column of results,
corresponding to parsimonious controls and the full sample), the inequality measure has a quantitatively
signi￿cant positive e⁄ect on in￿ ation. The range of the inequality parameter in the 50-country sample
of model 1 is 22% to 54%. Given the coe¢ cient estimate of .009, the estimated e⁄ect of increasing
inequality from the lowest inequality observation to the highest would be to add an additional 0.24 to
the in￿ ation tax transform. If in￿ ation were initially at zero, this would translate into an increase in the
in￿ ation rate to around 31%. Similarly, there is a quantitatively and statistically signi￿cant negative
e⁄ect (as predicted by theory) on income tax revenues as a % of GDP, estimated at -6%. Finally, there
is a quantitiatively small and statistically insigni￿cant e⁄ect on government consumption spending (as
a % of GDP). The insigni￿cance of this e⁄ect also backs up the theoretical portion of the paper.
The political variable parcomp has the expected negative (and statistically signi￿cant) e⁄ect on
in￿ ation. Quantitatively, moving from the highest value for parcomp to the lowest (from 5 to 1)
would increase the predicted value of b ￿ by 22%. Starting with price stability, this would translate
into an increase in the rate of in￿ ation of 27%.13 The estimated e⁄ect on income tax revenues is also
quantitatively signi￿cant: moving from minimum bias (parcomp = 5) to maximum bias (parcomp = 1)
would add around 3.5 percentage points to the ratio of income tax revenue to GDP. The e⁄ect on
government consumption spending, predicted to be zero in the model, is actually statistically and
quantitatively signi￿cant. The estimated e⁄ect of moving from minimum to maximum pro-rich bias
would be to reduce spending by more than 5% of GDP.14
7 Conclusions
This paper presents a model to account for a stylised fact noted in a number of studies: that more
unequal societies tend to face higher in￿ ation. The model uses a simpli￿ed overlapping generations
framework to capture the essential features of a cash economy with politically-motivated monetary
expansions. Consumption is subject to a one-period delay. Agents have a choice of two ￿nancial assets
to allow for trade with their neighbouring cohorts: cash (subject to the in￿ ation tax) and a second
asset which can be thought of as an indexed asset, a real asset or a foreign currency asset. The ability
to substitute from cash to the second asset is assumed to be correlated with income.
This then generates the feature that seigniorage is a more regressive form of taxation than income
tax, matching arguments made elsewhere in the literature. Introducing an electorally-motivated policy-
maker and a political environment subject to a pro-rich bias, the model predicts that higher inequality
and greater pro-rich bias both lead to greater recourse to seigniorage compared to income tax in equi-
librium. The result with respect to the pro-rich bias is obvious, the result with respect to inequality less
so. Note that positive seigniorage is the result of the political process alone: pure welfare-maximisation
implies zero seigniorage (as shown by the solution to the Ramsey problem).
The model￿ s strengths lie in its simpli￿cations at the household level. These allow for analytical
solutions and greater realism in both the income distribution and the political environment, compared
to the related literature, notably Albanesi (2002) and Bhattacharya et al. (2003). Although the model is
micro-founded and agents are fully rational, the treatment of the household could be strengthened. But
the purpose of this paper is to analyse economy-wide political phenomena, and a realistic treatment of
13However, the counterpart variable xrcomp, which one would expect to have the same sign, actually has a positive and
signi￿cant coe¢ cient estimate. This suggests that there are aspects of the relationship between the political environment
and money creation, notably the process of executive recruitment, which are not captured in the simple theoretical
framework.
14This suggests that government consumption spending may in reality be targeted at poorer agents, rather than being
a pure public good as in the model.
19political processes and the income distribution is more important than attention to micro-foundations.
Analytical solutions and unequivocal comparative statics results are other signi￿cant advantages of this
approach.
The model￿ s predictions are brought to the data and are broadly supported for the limited (￿fty-
country) cross-section dictated by data availability constraints. However, there is some evidence that
the simple political economy model may be missing some important relationships, particularly between
the pro-rich bias in the political system overall and the openness of the selection process for the exec-
utive. There is also evidence that the regulation of the political system in addition to its openness or
competitiveness plays a role, again with di⁄ering results between the overall political system and the
selection of chief executive.
Possible extensions to the model include the analysis of dynamics (although the analysis of dynamic
political economy models is highly complex - see for instance Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999), Krusell
(2002) and Hassler et al. (2003)), and further empirical work to analyse the predicted relationships.
A panel data approach to the problem would be a desirable next step. However, data availability
constraints - particularly due to the long-run nature of the relationships under analysis and the limited
availability of good inequality series - make useful panel analysis di¢ cult.
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22Table 1: 2SLS Regressions with Inflation Tax Transform [π/(1+ π)] (1981-2000 average) 
as DV 
 
Full Controls  Minimum Controls   























































































     
























































2  .71 .72  .70 .67 .71  .64 
F-Statistic  11.17*** 6.27***  11.21*** 12.66*** 9.47***  11.60*** 
Observations  50 32  48 50 32  48 
 
Gini (1981-2000) instrumented by Gini (1961-80). SEs reported are robust. ‘Minimum 
Controls’ regressions contain only controls that are individually statistically significant 
themselves. ‘Full Control’ regression results shown for robustness purposes. 
Significance level of individual regressors and of the overall equation denoted by ***:1%; 
**:5%; *:10%. 
 Table 2: 2SLS Regressions with Income Tax Revenues [% GDP] (1981-2000 average) as 
DV 
 
Full Controls  Minimum Controls   



































































    




     



















































2  .59 .46  .58 .52 .30  .54 
F-Statistic  12.55*** 3.49***  5.49***  12.52*** 5.01***  12.59*** 
Observations  49 31  47 50 32  47 
 
Gini (1981-2000) instrumented by Gini (1961-80). SEs reported are robust. ‘Minimum 
Controls’ regressions contain only controls that are individually statistically significant 
themselves. ‘Full Control’ regression results shown for robustness purposes. 
Significance level of individual regressors and of the overall equation denoted by ***:1%; 
**:5%; *:10%. 
 Table 3: 2SLS Regressions with Government Final Consumption [% GDP] (1981-2000 
average) as DV 
 
Full Controls  Minimum Controls   





































































    




     




















    
























2  .53 .45  .52 .36 .17  .37 
F-Statistic  4.82*** 1.17  5.10*** 11.75***  2.77*  12.05*** 
Observations  50 32  48 52 33  49 
 
Gini (1981-2000) instrumented by Gini (1961-80). SEs reported are robust. ‘Minimum 
Controls’ regressions contain only controls that are individually statistically significant 
themselves. ‘Full Control’ regression results shown for robustness purposes. 
Significance level of individual regressors and of the overall equation denoted by ***:1%; 
**:5%; *:10%. Table 4: Estimated Quantitative Effects of Changes in Inequality and Bias Terms from 
Minimum in Sample to Maximum in Sample 
 
Full Controls  Minimum Controls   








Inflation Rate (%) 
Gini 31.7**  24.1  33.3**  31.0***  24.3***  40.4*** 
Bias 21.7**  28.9**  21.4**  27.4***  29.3***  23.2** 
Income Tax Revenue (% GDP) 
Gini -4.3  -8.4  -4.3  -6.0**  -7.8***  -4.9 
Bias  -3.7 -0.7  -3.7  -3.5*** -3.1  -4.0*** 
Government Consumption Spending (% GDP) 
Gini  0.8 -4.6 1.2  -2.4 -0.1  -2.7 
Bias  0.1 4.6  -0.0  -5.2*** 0.2  -4.8** 
 
‘Minimum Controls’ regressions contain only controls that are individually statistically 
significant themselves (See Tables 1-3). ‘Full Control’ regression results shown for 
robustness purposes. 
Individual effects significantly different from zero at the following levels: ***:1%; 
**:5%; *:10%. 
Inequality: Change is from Gini of 22% to Gini of 54% 
Bias: Change is from parcomp=5 to parcomp=1 
Maxima and Minima taken from full sample. 
For Inflation Rate, effects assume an initial inflation rate of zero. 
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